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Lifetime Leverage Choice for Proprietary Farmers
in a Dynamic Stochastic  Environment
Robert A.  Collins and Larry S. Karp
This article reviews various models that may be used to explain optimal lever-
age choice for the proprietary farmer in a stochastic dynamic environment and
develops  a new model that highlights the risk of failure rather than the usual
concept of risk as the variability of wealth. The model suggests that in addition
to the usual factors, farm financial leverage  is affected by age, wealth, and the
opportunity cost of farming.
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Introduction
Farmers  often  make  substantial  changes  in  financial  leverage  over time.  A frequently
observed  pattern  is for a young  farmer to  start out heavily in debt,  and  pay down the
debt over time, if the farm is successful. Young farmers who are unsuccessful  seek alter-
native employment in the agribusiness sector, or join the rural-to-urban migration move-
ment. Given constant parameters  for risk aversion and the underlying probability distri-
bution, systematic planned changes in leverage over time are not consistent with existing
static models of farm  leverage choice (such as Barry, Baker, and Sanint  1980,  1981; and
Collins).  In addition,  many existing  models  of dynamic  leverage  choice  either  fail to
explain this behavior, or are based on unattractive  assumptions.
A popular explanation  for these leverage  changes is that young farmers are willing to
take  chances  while  older  farmers  are  more  conservative.'  Even  though  changing  risk
aversion  could  explain  changing  lifetime leverage  choices,  there  is little  evidence  that
farmers become more risk averse with age.2 An alternative  explanation is that leverage
choice is a dynamic process. This could mean that even if risk aversion or the parameters
of the relevant density function did not change,  a farmer could plan to change leverage
over time.
This article introduces a stochastic optimal control model of farm leverage choice that
models failure risk rather  than the typical  concept of variability  of wealth.  An analytic
solution is presented that gives qualitative  results on how optimal leverage changes over
time  and in response  to changing wealth and  the  changing opportunity  cost of being a
farmer.  The  first  section  discusses  previous  dynamic  stochastic  models  of proprietary
leverage.  The second section  develops an alternative model of farm leverage choice that
considers the farmer's risk of bankruptcy. The text discusses the assumptions and impli-
cations of the models, with most technical material left to appendices.  The final section
summarizes and states the primary testable implications of the model. The model suggests,
in addition to the usual factors that affect the costs and benefits of leverage,  that wealth,
the opportunity cost of farming, and age also affect optimal leverage choice.
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Review  of Previous  Models  of Farm Leverage
Recent work by Featherstone, Preckel,  and  Baker uses discrete  stochastic programming
to evaluate  leverage  decisions.  These models can  evaluate  various  objectives including
expected utility, allow detailed and realistic constraints,  and can produce valuable man-
agerial information. However,  due to the curse of dimensionality, the model allows only
a small number of time periods.  The  focus of the model is normative  and shows  only
solutions for optimal initial debt rather than optimal behavior over time.  Solutions for
two time periods are  shown in Featherstone,  Baker, and Preckel,  where optimal second-
period  debt  is  constant  for  low-risk  aversion  and  decreasing  for higher  levels  of risk
aversion. The numerical methods used by Featherstone, Preckel,  and Baker do not allow
general conclusions about the qualitative nature of leverage decisions  over time.
Lowenberg-DeBoer  applies stochastic optimal control to the problem of farm leverage
for the case of stochastic land values. He assumes that farm income is nonstochastic and
that  land prices  follow  a diffusion  process.  The  farmer's  objective  is to  maximize  the
expected present value of farm income and capital gains over a finite horizon. The resulting
optimal time path for leverage decreases over time,  but the optimal amount of leverage
at any point in time increases with the drift parameter of the land price differential.  Since
the Lowenberg-DeBoer  model  assumes random  land prices, constant farm income, and
a risk-neutral decision maker, it emphasizes the farmer's role as a land speculator rather
than as a business manager.  It is interesting that the model  implies  that a risk-neutral
person pays  off debt over time; previous  static models of farm leverage  choice  offer no
explanation for this widely observed behavior.
Merton's  model of lifetime  portfolio  choice  also can be applied  to the  choice of farm
debt.  In that model,  return  on  risky  farm  assets  follows  a diffusion  process with  drift
parameter a and variance  a.  The  return to assets  could include both  capital  gains and
farm income.  The decision problem is to allocate wealth between risky farm assets with
expected return a and the riskless asset with known return r. By borrowing at rate r, total
risky  farm  assets  can exceed  wealth.3 The  stochastic  differential  of wealth  shows  how
changes  in wealth (W)  depend on the proportion  of wealth  invested in risky  assets  (w),
consumption  choices (C),  and random elements:
dW = ([w(t)a +  (1  - w(t)r)] W(t)  - C(t))dt + w(t)aZ(t) W(t)V/t,
where  Z(t)  is  Brownian  motion.  The  objective  is to  maximize  the  expected  utility of
discounted consumption,
Max  E  e-rtU[C(t)] dt.
For the constant relative  risk aversion utility function,  U(C) = C/y, the solution to the
maximization problem is
w*(t)  =  r
2(1  - y)'
Several things are notable about this solution. First, it is not a function of either wealth
or time.  The optimal proportion  of wealth invested in risky farm assets increases as the
excess of the  expected  return  over the  borrowing  rate  increases,  and it decreases  with
increases in risk and risk aversion, but the farmer would have no plans to change leverage
over time,  or  as  wealth  changes.  Second,  this  solution  is the dynamic  analog  of some
static models  of farm  leverage.  Since equity  is the equivalent  of wealth,  the proportion
of wealth invested in risky assets can be regarded as the ratio of farm assets to farm equity.
Therefore, the optimal ratio of equity (E) to assets (A)  (or one minus the debt-asset ratio)
is:
E*  2(l-  )
VA/  a-r
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This  solution  is analogous  to Collins'  equation  (11)  (p.  629),  which  shows  an optimal




where Ra is the expected  return on risky assets, k is the cost of borrowing,  and p is the
coefficient of constant absolute risk aversion.  The solutions  are identical  except that the
coefficient  of constant  absolute  risk aversion  (p) from  the  negative  exponential  utility
function replaces the coefficient of constant relative risk aversion (1 - y) from the power
utility function.  This solution is also equivalent to equation (7) of Barry, Baker, and Sanint
(1980, p.  153).  Recognizing that their X  is twice the coefficient of absolute risk aversion,
and solving for the  optimal ratio of equity to assets produces an identical result.
The above discussion suggests that these models neglect several important elements  of
the farm leverage  decision.  In addition,  models based on a diffusion process implicitly
assume  that adjustments  can be made at the same  speed at which  events occur.  Given
an equity level, a decrease  in leverage  requires that assets be sold and the proceeds used
to retire debt. An increase in leverage requires an expansion in scale if equity is constant.
Both of these adjustments  require  time and planning,  and  the farmer  might simply  be
overtaken by events.  Finally,  none of these  models explicitly consider  the most severe
potential consequence of leverage-bankruptcy.
A Dynamic  Leverage  Model Based  on a Jump Process
Dynamic leverage models based on a diffusion process assume that farm income or asset
values vary continuously. While it is likely that farm asset values do vary continuously,
and increases in leverage  tend to amplify the effect of these variations on farm equity, it
is  less  clear that these continuous  variations  are  a primary  concern  to the farmer.  An
alternative  objective  is balancing the longer term returns from leverage with the hazard
of a business failure caused  by leverage.  The model in this section shifts the focus from
momentary variations  in wealth  to potential  financial  catastrophe.  The  farmer  is  risk
neutral and wishes to maximize the expected present value of lifetime wealth. The choice
variables are financial leverage and withdrawals of income for personal consumption over
'the lifetime of the farm. We assume that the only external financing available to the farmer
is debt.
First, consider the relationship between the choice of leverage, 6, and the rate of return
on equity net of interest and taxes,  I(6).4 As leverage  increases from a low level, the rate
of return on equity increases if the rate of return on assets exceeds the cost of borrowing,
because more assets are working for each dollar of equity. This is the well-known leverage
multiplier effect.  Since  increases  in leverage  also increase  the probability  of a  disaster
which  causes  increased  risk of loss  for the lender, the cost of borrowing  also  increases
with leverage. Therefore,  1(6) increases at a decreasing rate, i.e., is concave in 6. We also
assume that the rate of return on  equity is nonstochastic  as long as the farm survives.
The function  I(  ), however,  could be regarded as the certainty equivalent  of risky farm
income. Appendix E addresses the problem when the return on equity is random, but the
primary focus of the model is on the risk of failure rather than the variability of income.
The income produced by the farm depends on both the amount of equity and the rate
of return on equity. Assuming constant returns to scale,  farm income  after interest and
taxes at time  t is  the rate of return  on  equity  times  the amount  of equity,  I[6(t)]E(t).
Defining  w(t) as the proportion of income withdrawn by the farmer for consumption,  1
- w(t) is the proportion of income  that is retained. If the farm  does not fail over the
interval dt, the change in farm equity is dE(t) = [1  - w(t)]I(b(t))]E(t)dt. The rate of wealth
accumulation depends on leverage and withdrawals for consumption.
The risk of financial catastrophe  also depends on leverage  choice. A farmer may face
a  variety  of economic  setbacks  such  as  poor yields,  low  prices,  floods,  fires,  or  rapid
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Figure 1.  The rate of return on equity  and the probability of failure as functions of leverage,  and
the maximum  risk-adjusted rate of return on equity
declines  in asset values.  The ability  of the farm to withstand negative  income  or other
asset losses depends on leverage. If a farm  loses 20% of its assets for any reason, a farm
with  a debt-asset ratio greater than 80%  will be bankrupt.  A farm with a lower leverage
will  survive.  Therefore,  given  a  distribution  of different  sizes  of potential  losses,  the
probability of a farm's failure  is an increasing  function of leverage.  Figure  1 shows the
probability of a disaster  y(  ) and I(  ). The  leverage  level that maximizes  the difference
between  I(  ) and  y( ) is denoted  as 5. This is  the leverage  level at which  the marginal
effect of leverage  on "return"  equals  the marginal  effect of leverage  on  "risk,"  and the
risk-adjusted rate of return on equity, I(  )  - y( ), is maximized.5
The stochastic differential for equity is the (deterministic) retention of earnings plus the
stochastic term that indicates whether a disaster occurs:
(1)  dE(t) = [1  - w(t)]I[6(t)]E(t)dt + Edir,
where Pr(dr  = -1)  =  y[6(t)]dt +  o(dt), and Pr(dr = 0)  = 1 - y[(t)]dt + o(dt);  y'  > 0,
y" > 0;  o(dt) denotes terms of order dt. Hereafter,  the variable t is suppressed where the
meaning  is  clear.  The  stochastic  term is  a jump  process.6 As  long as  dir = 0,  equity
continues to grow  at the rate that earnings are retained.  As leverage increases,  however,
the probability  of a disaster increases.  If a disaster occurs,  dir = -1  and all equity  dis-
appears.  This stochastic  differential  establishes  the relationships  between  the farmer's
choices and the equity of the farm. It serves as the constraint for the farmer's maximization
problem.
The  farmer's  objective  is maximization  of the present value  of expected wealth,  the
present  value  of the stream  of withdrawals  until  retirement  plus  the present  value  of
terminal equity resulting from the liquidation of the farm at retirement (T):
(2)  T  r
J(E, t) =  max  Et  e-PswIEds +  e-PTE(T),
6E[0, 1]  t
we[4,  oo
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where  tE is the expectations operator conditional  on information available at time t and
p  is the  riskless  rate of time preference.  The  value function J( )  is discounted to time
zero, the beginning of the planning period.
The farmer's choices  are constrained.  The  debt-asset ratio must be between zero and
one. Withdrawals have a lower bound of w.  A positive value of w means that the farmer
cannot  choose  to retain  all earnings,  and  absolute withdrawals  must increase  as  equity
increases.  A negative  value of w implies that the farmer has access to external equity to
bring into the firm. In many cases it may be reasonable to assume that w is zero,  i.e., the
farmer  can retain  all  earnings,  but cannot obtain  external  equity  financing.  For the re-
mainder  of the  text,  we  assume  w =  0.  The  rate of withdrawals  is unbounded  above,
which  means the farmer  can liquidate  the farm at any time,  and withdraw  the equity,
E(t). This would entail an infinite withdrawal rate for an instant of time.
Maximization  of (2)  subject  to (1) and  the control  constraints produces  the  optimal
dynamic  leverage and withdrawal  strategy for the farm. Implicit in this statement of the
problem is the assumption that if the farmer goes bankrupt, the value  of the remaining
time (T - t) is zero. That is, the boundary condition is J(0, t) = 0. Under this assumption,
the optimal plan solves the following  dynamic  programming  equation (Mangel, pp.  50-
51):
(3)  -tJ  = max [e-PtwI(6)E + JE(1 - w)EI(b) - Jy(6)].
6,w
Subscripts  indicate  partial derivatives.  The negative  of the time derivative of the value
function  equals  the maximized  value of the  sum  of three  terms.  The first  term is  the
present value  of the  flow  of withdrawals;  the second is the shadow value of equity,  JE,
times the flow of retained earnings, conditional  on not going bankrupt; the third is minus
the value of  the firm, J( ), times the probability of  bankruptcy. The first two terms comprise
the Hamiltonian  of the deterministic version of this problem  (zero bankruptcy  risk).
The solution to this model is in appendix A. The primary implications of the solution
are summarized  in:
Proposition  1:
(i)  If  I(6)  - yr()  = p, it is optimal to set 6 = 6;  withdrawal policy is irrelevant.
(ii)  If 1(6)  - 7y()  < p, it is optimal to liquidate immediately.
(iii)  If  1(6)  - (6)  >  p,  it is  optimal  to set w  =  w.  For  w =  0,  it is  optimal to
maintain 6 = 6.
This proposition  has a very intuitive interpretation.  If the risk-adjusted rate  of return
on equity,  I(6) - y(6),  equals the riskless discount rate, p, where the former is maximized,
then the farmer is indifferent between liquidating and staying in business. If the maximized
value of the risk-adjusted  expected return is less than the discount rate, the farmer does
better by immediate liquidation and investing the farm's equity at rate p. If the maximized
risk-adjusted expected rate of return on equity is greater than the discount rate, the value
of the farm  as  a going  concern  exceeds  its liquidation value  and,  therefore,  the farmer
chooses to operate the farm.  The farmer  chooses the leverage  that maximizes  the risk-
adjusted return on equity and holds it constant.
The ratio of the value of the firm as  a going concern, J(E, t), to its liquidation  value,
E,  at time  t is denoted f(t). We  show in appendix A that if p <  I(6)  - y( 6 ), then f(t) =
exp{[p  +  y()  - I(6)](t - T)}. The ratio of the value of the firm as a going concern to its
liquidation value decreases  over time at a constant rate  equal to the difference between
the risk-adjusted  expected return and the riskless discount rate.  Equivalently, f(t) is the
present value, discounted at p,  of a dollar at time  t that is growing at rate  I(6)  over the
remaining horizon,  times the probability that bankruptcy does not occur.
However, the boundary condition,  , t) = 0, ignores an important aspect of  the farmer's
choice problem: the opportunity cost of running the farm. The opportunity cost is a fixed
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cost of being a farmer, but it does affect the optimal leverage choice,  because the size of
the capitalized  alternative wage  available  off the farm affects the farmer's willingness to
take a chance  on bankruptcy. Thus, we now replace the assumption that conditional on
bankruptcy, the value of the farmer's program (i.e., "wealth") is zero, with the assumption
that the bankrupt farmer's wealth is the capitalized value of remaining  wages available
at the best off-farm  opportunity,  a measure of human capital.  While financial  capital is
lost in a bankruptcy,  human capital is retained. If the opportunity cost of farming7 is $c
per year, the present value of future wages  at time t for the remaining  T - t = r  years is
c(l  - e-P)/p. Since the time path is being planned at time zero, this annuity of $c from
t to Tmust be discounted back to time zero. Therefore, an alternative boundary condition
is that the present value of the farmer's wealth at time zero if bankruptcy occurs at t is:
J(O, t) =  e- t(c/p)(l  - e-P).
The value of the farmer's remaining human capital from  off-farm  employment declines
as time passes.
Two factors now influence  the farmer's willingness to risk bankruptcy: the amount of
equity  that would be lost and  the amount of capitalized wealth available  from off-farm
employment.  The capitalized wealth available  from off-farm  employment declines  over
time,  so if bankruptcy  does occur, the farmer  would  prefer it to  happen sooner  rather
than later.  This causes  risk to be  allocated differently  over time and, therefore,  capital
structure changes over time.
The  opportunity  cost  of farming  also  affects  the decision  of whether  to  operate  or
liquidate the farm. When opportunity cost is ignored, the farmer will choose to operate
the farm whenever the expected rate of return to equity (I(6)) exceeds the required rate
of return for farming (p  +  y(6)  a). However,  when opportunity cost is considered,  the
farmer may choose to liquidate the farm even if I(6) > a. For example, if the farmer's
initial equity is very small, even the maximum possible rate of return on equity may not
produce an earnings stream equivalent to the opportunity cost. Throughout the remainder
of the article, we make two assumptions: (a) I(6) > a, and (b) when deciding whether to
liquidate the farm at t, the farmer acts as if the option will not be available in the future.
Assumption (a) simply means the problem is relevant, i.e., the risk-adjusted rate of return
from farming exceeds the riskless rate. If that assumption did not hold, the farmer would
want to liquidate for all  levels of equity. Assumption  (b) permits us to solve  a simpler
problem in which the value of the program at (E, t) is calculated using the optimal leverage,
given that voluntary liquidation will never occur. This value is compared to the liquidating
value at (E, t) to determine  if liquidation  is optimal.8
Figure 2 shows the following functions: The curve J(E, t, c) gives the value of behaving
optimally, conditional upon not liquidating.  The linear function,  L(E, t,  c) is the value
of liquidating the farm at any time  t which  is the capitalized  value of remaining  wages
and current equity,
(4)  L(E, t, c) = e - Pt -- )  + E.
P  ]
As E(O) approaches zero, J(  ) also approaches zero while the liquidating value approaches
the value  of capitalized  wages.  Increases  in E(O) cause  a  linear  increase  in  L(  ),  but
nonlinear increases in J(  ), if I(6) > a. The breakeven level of equity, E(t), equates the
capitalized lifetime income  stream from  farming with the liquidating value of the farm.
The breakeven level of equity is clearly a function of time since both functions shift over
time.
Although it is not possible to obtain an exact solution of the control problem for c >
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Figure  2.  The value  of operating the farm and the value  of liquidating the farm as functions  of
equity, and the breakeven level  of equity
0,  an approximate  solution  is obtained  by taking  a Taylor  expansion  of the  dynamic
programming equation.  Under the assumption that the value function and its derivatives
are analytic in c in the neighborhood  of c = 0, this procedure  gives decision rules which
are approximately  optimal  for small values  of c.  The following  discussion  is based on
analysis of these rules, and thus concerns the  case where c is small.
Designating E(t) as the equity  at t, given bankruptcy  has not occurred,  it is shown in
appendix C that if E(O) > E(O), then E(t) > E(t) for all t. This means that if initial equity
is large  enough  to make  farming  profitable  compared  to off-farm  opportunities,  it will
remain so  over time, if bankruptcy  does not occur. Therefore,  if the farmer  chooses to
farm initially,  the option to liquidate prior to retirement has no value.
The next step is to determine  an approximation,  for small c, of the function J(e, t, c)
(the value of behaving optimally, conditional upon not liquidating).  The solution provides
the optimal debt-asset ratio, b*(E, t; c), and gives the minimum level of equity for farming
to be profitable,  E(t), when opportunity  cost is positive.
Given the decision not to liquidate in the current instant and the result that liquidation
will not occur in the future (so that it is optimal to set w = 0), the function J satisfies the
dynamic programming  equation
(5)  -J,  = max{((6)[L(0,  t,  c)  - J(E, t,  c)] +  JE(E, t, c)I(b)E}.
Appendix B shows the derivation  of the following first-order approximation  and a sum-
mary of the results of a second-order approximation:
(6)  J(E, t,  c)  e-P [f(t)E  + (  - 1  - )c
=  e-.'f  (t)E + c  -P(s-t)(l1  - e  )(s - t)) ds .
t_  _i
$
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This equation states that, to a first-order approximation, the increase in the value of equity
due to a positive c is the value of the discounted  flow c weighted by the probability,  1 -
e
-
y(6)(s-t), that the farmer will go bankrupt and receive  c.
The expression for E, the critical level of equity, can be obtained by equating (6), the
value of equity from  farming, to the value of liquidating, L(  ), given in (4).
(7)  Ef() - E  =  - e)-  cJ  e-(-)(  - e- ( ) ds.
p
At the  critical  level of equity,  the increase  in the value of equity  due to farming equals
the difference  between the  certain wage  (if liquidation  occurs  immediately)  and the ex-
pected earnings from farming.  Solving for E gives
c  - e-\  c(  eo-  -
(8)  E(t)  -(=  (-e-c(  e  ) a  ,a  \eI(  - ear!
Equation (8) provides a first-order approximation of the true E; in order not to encumber
the  notation, E is used for both  the true  function and  the approximation.  Analysis  of
equation (8)  shows how the breakeven level of equity changes over time:
~(9)  -~<0 (9)  d--  < 0, dr
(10)  lim E(r) = 0,  and
(11)  lim E(r)
r-o  1(6)-p  - ()
The minimum  level of equity needed  to persuade  the proprietor to remain  in farming
increases as retirement approaches. For older farmers, the possibility of building up equity
through farming is limited, but the risk of bankruptcy remains; they do better by liquidating
the farm,  investing in a riskless asset,  and collecting the flow  c. Rearranging  (11)  gives,
at r = 0, E(I(8) - a) = c; at retirement,  a farmer with the critical level of equity receives
a risk-adjusted  flow  from  farming  equal to the certain  flow  under the alternative  em-
ployment.
For any value of equity,  the return to liquidating at time zero  is bounded above by E
+  c/p.  However, f  becomes  unbounded  as r  approaches  infinity,  since  a  is  positive;
therefore, J( ) becomes unbounded for arbitrarily  small positive initial levels of equity.
That is, given a sufficiently long horizon,  the value of remaining in farming exceeds E +
c/p for even very small values of equity. These results are summarized  as:
Proposition  2: Older farmers require higher levels of equity to induce them to remain
in farming.
The next objective  is to determine the effect of the opportunity cost of farming (c) on
the optimal leverage. When opportunity cost is not considered, optimal leverage (6)  simply
maximizes the risk-adjusted rate of return to equity and is not affected by time or wealth.
When opportunity cost is considered, optimal leverage  is 5 +  A(E,  c, t). The exact form
of A is shown in appendix  D. The increment to leverage (A) is a nonnegative  function of
age and wealth. Therefore, the consideration  of opportunity cost creates  a solution where
more debt is optimal, but the  size of the increment  changes with  age and wealth.
The partial effects  of equity and time on optimal leverage  are shown by
(12)  < 0
9-E  fE 2
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(13)  =  Ef
2a'  [a - I(b)(1  - e
1 )].
The total effect of time when equity changes are considered  is
dA  aA  aO  dE _A  gc  ce!')
-
a)r
(14)  do  =  <  I(_)E  < 0.
dt  (t  OE dt  -dt  fE 2 Ef2
When opportunity cost is considered,  the partial effect of an increase in equity makes
farmers behave more cautiously despite risk neutrality.  When equity is small,  the farmer
is  nearly  indifferent  between  going bankrupt  and  staying in  business.  This  causes  the
farmer to take greater risks and choose higher leverage.  When equity is large, a potential
bankruptcy  is much more costly and the return from alternative  employment is small by
comparison. These factors cause a wealthier farmer to behave more cautiously and choose
lower leverage. This "risk-averse"  behavior occurs even though the farmer is risk neutral.
The  effect of age  on leverage,  holding  equity  constant,  may be  positive  or negative.
From (13), the  leverage is decreasing  over time as farmers near retirement (r close to 0),
but is increasing for  young farmers  (r large).  From the  definition  of A (appendix  D), it
can be seen that A = 0 for r = 0 or r  =  0°, and A > 0 when r is between zero and infinity.
Therefore,  given  a constant level of equity,  the model predicts  relatively "risk-averse"
behavior on the part of very old and very young farmers, despite the fact that all farmers
are risk neutral.
If the horizon is sufficiently long, young farmers tend to be cautious because the value
of farming is very large relative to the value of the nonfarm alternative [given assumption
(a)]. As the horizon becomes shorter, the relative attractiveness  of farming becomes less
extreme,  and leverage increases  until it reaches  a maximum.  Beyond that point, (older)
farmers tend to become less highly levered as they approach retirement; their opportunities
outside farming decrease [L(0, t, c) decreases],  and they consequently decrease the risk of
losing their wealth.  In other words, the caution of young farmers is motivated by desire
to remain in farming,  whereas the caution of older farmers is motivated by the reluctance
to depend on nonfarm income for retirement. The limiting leverage as r approaches either
zero or infinity is 8. Leverage  is maximized where  OA/dt  = 0 which, from (13),  occurs at
*  -ln[(I-  a)/I]/a. Suppose, for example, that I(6) =  .077 (continuously compounded)
for an annual expected  return on equity of 8%.  If the required rate of return,  a, is 90%
of I,  then t*  =  33  years; that is,  farmers within  33  years of retirement are expected  to
decrease  their leverage  given constant equity.  If a is 80% of I, t* =  26 years.  Therefore,
the  theory  suggests that the partial  effect of age  is consistent with  a hump-shaped  time
profile of leverage  for reasonable parameter  values. An analysis of a cross-sectional  data
set should show a hump-shaped effect of age on leverage when equity is held constant.
The total effect of time on leverage considers both of the partial effects. A farmer expects
equity to grow, conditional on not going bankrupt. As (14) shows, the effect of an increase
in  equity  on leverage  will  always  dominate  the effect  of time  so  that,  for  a particular
farmer,  leverage  is expected to decrease  over  time.  The inequality in (14) is due  to the
fact that at all points the leverage is not less than 8,  so that the rate  of increase in equity,
given that bankruptcy does not occur, is not less than I(6).
These conclusions are summarized  as:
Proposition  3:
(i)  Farmers with high equity choose lower debt-asset ratios than farmers with low
equity.
(ii)  Given  the same  level  of equity,  older  farmers  are  less  highly  levered  than
middle-aged farmers;  the latter may be more highly levered than very young
farmers.
(iii)  An individual farmer tends to decrease leverage over time, conditional on not
going bankrupt.Journal  of Agricultural  and  Resource Economics
The use of "older,"  "middle-aged,"  and "very young" in Proposition  3 is imprecise,  but
the meaning is clear from the discussion  of (13).
Conclusions  and Testable Implications
Static models of farm leverage choice which only consider how leverage amplifies ambient
business risk, and  dynamic models which  ignore  opportunity cost and bankruptcy  risk
neglect important factors in the leverage choice decision and fail to provide explanations
for important observed phenomena.  The model described above simultaneously provides
an explanation  for the apparent  risk-seeking  behavior  some young  farmers  exhibit by
carrying  very  heavy  debt  loads,  and  also  the  apparent  risk-avoiding behavior  that is
frequently  observed  when middle-aged  farmers  choose  to reduce their debt rather than
expand  the scale  of the  farm.  However,  these  apparent  risk-seeking  and  risk-avoiding
behaviors  arise  from  the model  even though the  farmer  is  risk neutral.  Since  a "risk
response"  arises from  accounting  for dynamics, opportunity cost,  and stochastic failure
when the utility function of wealth is linear, it suggests that there may be alternatives to
the embattled  expected utility  hypothesis  for explaining  other risk-avoiding  behaviors.
The model also  illustrates  the potential importance  that off-farm  factors  may  have on
optimal farm choices. While all introductory classes  stress that an important cost of being
a farmer  is the opportunity  cost, all  too often this  important factor  is ignored in farm-
level modeling.
The model has several assumptions and implications that could be subjected to econo-
metric testing. The primary assumption is that farmers are not concerned about the effects
of leverage  on the variability of income, but are concerned  about being devastated by a
financial  catastrophe.  While  this  might be  difficult  to  test conclusively,  the  secondary
assumptions are more straightforward:  Return on equity is a concave function of leverage
but independent of scale, and the probability of failure is an increasing nonconcave (linear
or convex) function of leverage.
The testable implications  of the model are as follows:
(1)  Leverage depends on age. The model predicts the partial  effect of age to be hump-
shaped. In a cross-section data set, if equity and opportunity cost are held constant,
one would expect to find young farmers increasing leverage while older farmers are
reducing leverage.
(2)  Leverage depends on wealth. The partial effect of wealth is negative. If opportunity
cost  and age  are  held constant,  one  should  find that high equity  farmers  choose
lower debt-asset ratios than low equity farmers. This suggests, ceteris paribus, that
the scale  of the farm expands  slower than equity.
(3) Leverage depends on opportunity cost. The partial  effect of capitalized alternative
earnings  on leverage  is positive.  Clearly, opportunity  cost depends on alternative
earnings, time to retirement,  and the discount rate.
(4)  Wealth affects the retirement decision. The model suggests that richer farmers will
retire  later.
(5)  Survivingfarms reduce debt over time. The total effect of time, given other factors
are allowed to adjust,  is negative.
[Received June 1992; final revision received April 1993.]
Notes
This explanation was gained from conversations with agricultural bankers.
2 Evidence on changes in risk aversion with age is not compelling.  See Whittaker and Winter.
3 Merton  suggests this interpretation of the model in footnote  10.
4 The income of the farm also depends on all the usual  factors that affect the rate of return on assets. These
other factors are assumed to be held constant. Therefore, I(  ) represents the partial effect of leverage on the rate
of return  on farm equity.
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5The  expected  return  for  $1 of equity  for a period  of dt is  (1 + I)dt(l  - y)dt  = (1 + I - y)dt - Iydt
2.
Therefore, I - y may be regarded as a risk-adjusted rate of return.
6 A  standard method of analyzing this type of problem converts the stochastic  control problem into a deter-
ministic  problem and  then uses  the Maximum  Principle  (Kamien and Schwartz).  The nonstationarity  due to
the farmer's  finite horizon makes  that approach  impractical here.  The use of a jump process leads to a simple
characterization  of the solution.
7 Other interpretations of this constant are possible.  For example, it may reflect the nonpecuniary  (dis)utility
of living off the farm.
8 Assumption  (b) is innocuous  in the following  sense:  If at an arbitrary time t the farmer does not want to
liquidate, then conditional upon not going bankrupt, there will be no desire to liquidate at any future time. This
is discussed  below and is proven for t  = 0 in appendix C.
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Appendix  A: Solution  to Control Model
Due to the assumptions on I( ) and  y( ) described in the text, the optimal value of 6 lies in the interior of (0,
1).  However, the maximand in (3) is linear in w, so  the optimal value  of this control may be on the boundary
of the constraint.  Liquidating  the firm requires  w =  oo;  this is optimal if the value of the equity  in the firm,
J(  ),  is less than or equal to e-P'E. Since liquidation is always an option, the minimum value of the firm is e-P'E.
If the value of equity is greater than the liquidation value, the manager retains the maximum amount of earnings
by setting w = w.
The first-order conditions for 6 and w are, respectively:
(Al)  [e-p w + JE(1  - w)]EI' - J'  = 0,  and
>  ooj
(A2)  (e-Pt - JE)EI  = 0  w = ?.
<<0  w
The  solution  to  the control  problem  requires  finding the  function J(  ) such that  when (Al) and  (A2) are
satisfied, both (3) and the boundary condition, J(E, T) =  e-PTE, are satisfied. It is straightforward  to verify that
the trial solution, J(  ) = f(t)e-P'E, with f(T) = 1, meets these conditions. The unknown function f(t) gives the
ratio of the value of the firm as a going concern to the liquidation value.
Substituting the trial solution  into (3), (Al), and (A2) and simplifying gives
(A3)  pf -f  = max [(w + f  - fw)I  - fy],
8,w
(A4)  I'(w  + f-fw)= f',
,>  oo0
(A5)  1 - f(t)  = 0  w = ?
<  0  w:
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(A dot over a variable represents total differentiation with respect to time.) Equation (A5) reproduces the intuition
suggested  above: If the value of the firm under  optimal leverage  is  less than the liquidation value (f(t)  <  1),
then  it is  optimal  to  liquidate;  if,  under  optimal  leverage,  the value  is just equal  to  the  liquidation value,
withdrawal  policies are irrelevant;  and under the third case, the farmer wants to increase  equity by as much as
possible.  Equation  (A3) holds only forf >  1 since, iff < 1, the farmer liquidates  and the problem ends.
Proof of Proposition  I
From (A4) and (A5), the optimal values of 6 and w are functions off but do not depend explicitly on time. For
f  > 1, these functions  can be  substituted into (A3) to obtain  the autonomous differential equation of the form
-f  =  h(f); dh/df is continuous  for f  >  1, where dh(l)/df is defined  as the limit of dh/df as f  approaches  1,
from above.
From the boundary  condition on  J( ), f(T)  =  1. If the firm  is  still in business  at T, (A4)  implies b[f(T)] =
5. By the definition  of h(  ), h(l) = 1(6)  - 'y()  - p.
If h(l) = 0, then f  is stationary at T and, therefore, f(t)  =  O  and f(t)  = 1  for t < T. Part (i) of the proposition
follows from (A4) and (A5).
If h(l) < 0  [p > I(6) - y(b)] and the firm had not liquidated by T,  then f(t) <  1  for some t. By (A5), the firm
must have  liquidated by T.  Suppose,  contrary to part (ii) of the proposition,  that h(l)  < 0 and that it was not
optimal to liquidate until time tl  >  0. Then, over  (0, t,) f  - 1, where h( ) and dh/df are continuous, and f(tl)
<  1.  This implies h(l)  > 0,  a contradiction.  It must be optimal to liquidate at time 0 if h(l) < 0. This is part
(ii) of the proposition.
If h(l) > 0 [p  < I(a)  - y(6)],  then f(T)  < 0. Therefore,  f(t)  <  0 for finite  T - t, so f(t) >  1 for t < T (and
finite T - t).  From (A5),  w = w is optimal. Rearrange  (A4) to obtain:
(A6)  I'(6)  - I
For w =  0, this gives part (iii) of the proposition.  Q.E.D.
Appendix  B: First- and Second-Order Approximations of the
Dynamic  Programming Equation
We assume  that J( ) is analytic at  c = 0,  so that the following approximation is valid:
(6')  J(E, t, c) = J(E, t, 0) + V(E,  t)c + o(c)
e- '{f(t)E  + (1  e-)c + g(E  t)c}.
P
The first equality gives the first-order approximation of J( ); the second equality uses the expression for J(E, t)
and decomposes the unknown function  V(  ) into L(0, t, c)  + g(  )c.  Equation (6') [compare to equation  (6) in
text] states that the value of not liquidating is, to a first-order approximation,  equal to the value of equity given
that c = 0, plus the value of going bankrupt at t given a positive level of c, plus the function g(  )c. The last term
must  be negative since  bankruptcy  occurs  with probability  less than  1; that is, the function g(  ) compensates
for the fact that L(0, t, c) overstates the value of the safety net.
Next,  6 is replaced  in equation  (5) with the  optimal function  6*(E,  t,  c),  and the maximization  operator  is
removed. A Taylor expansion  of the result at c = 0 is obtained,  using equation  (6') and the assumption  w = 0,
which implies that 6*(E,  t, 0) = 6, a constant. Using the envelope theorem then gives
(A7)  pe-Pt  + (1 - e  e-'[fE  + (1-  e-)-c + g  e-t[-e-  ,c]
P
=  y()e-pt(fE  + gc) + e-p(f + gEc)EI(8).
Equating coefficients in powers of c implies
(A8)  f= [a -()]f;  f(T)= 1,
and
(A9)  1 = g  - ag + EIgE;  g(T) =O.
These equations use the definition a =  y(6)  + p. Equation (A8) is a special case of (A3), using assumptions (a)
and w  = 0. Equation (A9) has the solution
(A10)  g=  -
aX
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which is independent  of E. One can verify directly that (A10) satisfies (A9); the solution was obtained using the
method of characteristics.  Substituting (A10) into (6)  gives the first-order approximation of J( ).
A higher order approximation was also considered.  The second-order  approximation of J( ), denoted J2(E,
t, c), is
(All)  J2(  ) = e-p  {f(t)E +  ^  + g(t)]c +
where y(t)  < 0 for  t  <  T.  Since J(E, t, c) is bounded below by 0, J2 underestimates  J for values of E near  0.
However,  the farmer  will not  stay  in  business at low  levels  of equity.  The first-order  approximation  of E
underestimates the true value. A second-order approximation for optimal leverage was calculated. The expression
is  complicated,  but  a  sufficient  condition  for 826*/8c2 >  0 is  "'()  ()  - I)  0;  therefore,  the  first-order
approximation  of 6*(  ) most likely understates optimal leverage.
Appendix C: Proof that if E(0)  > E(O),  then E(t) >  E(t)
Since  6*  >  1,  I > 1(6) conditional on not going bankrupt, so
dE(t)l
E(t)
L  J  J
(A12)  E(t)
For the remainder of the proof, the notation  is simplified  by writing I(a) as I. Equation (8) implies
dE(t)
dt  leIT  - aeT  aeaT
(A13) E(t)  eT  ea~  e~ - 1
The last two equations imply
d(ln E(t))  d(ln E(t))  le'  - Ie  - (Ie'  - ae- a)  aeaT
(A14)  -
dt  dt  eT  -e  e  e  - 1
e
a r
:(-  _  e)(e-  - 1[(a' - I)(e
a - 1) + a(e
IT
- eaT)]
The term outside the  square brackets  is positive and the term inside the brackets  simplifies to  I - a + q(r),
where q(r) = ae' - Iea
r, which is positive for r  > 0.
Therefore, the rate of increase in E is greater than that of E, and the assertion is proven.  Q.E.D.
Appendix D: Effect  of Opportunity Cost on Optimal Leverage
Substituting  the  approximation  of J( ), given  by (6),  into  (5) implies that  the approximation  of 5*(  ) must
maximize:
(A15)  f(t)EI(6)-  (f(t)E + g(t)c)y(6).
The first-order condition to this problem  is
(A16)  f(t)EI'()  - (f(t)E + g(t)c)y'(6) = 0.
Totally differentiating (A16) with respect to c and evaluating the result at c = 0 gives
ar-  :  tg(t)
(A17) (A17)  6c  IO f(t)E Oc  c:0  f(t)E'
with
(Al ') AA  < 0. (A18)  t=  --  y"(6)
The optimal function 5* can be approximated  as
(A19)  6*(E, t, c) = 6 + A(E,  t, c) + o(c),
with
tg(r)c  0 fA=  >  >0.
f(r)E
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Appendix E: Stochastic  Income
The rate  of return  to  equity could  be  modeled  as stochastic,  conditional on  bankruptcy not occurring.  This
modification  can be made by adding the product  of Brownian motion  and a function  of E and 6 to equation
(1). In the model where  c = 0,  the solution does not change. This can be  seen from Ito's lemma and the fact
that the value function remains linear in E. The risk-neutral farmer with c = 0 ignores a stochastic rate of return
and concentrates  on the risk of bankruptcy.  Matters are more complicated where c > 0. The reason is that with
a stochastic rate of return,  assumption (b) is no longer innocuous; the relation described in appendix C cannot
hold with probability  1. In addition, the value function is not linear in equity,  so the instantaneous  variance of
the rate  of return  to  equity would appear  in the  dynamic  programming  equation.  The effect  of including a
stochastic return  in the model with  c >  0  remains an unresolved issue.  The current model,  which assumes a
nonstochastic rate of return, is defended  as a "certainty equivalent" approximation which is useful to highlight
the farmer's  response to the threat of catastrophic  events.